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Abstract
Utilizing a panel data set for 13 developed economies, this paper examines the volatility of
capital flows following the liberalization of financial markets. The paper focuses on the
response of foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, and other debt flows to both financial
liberalization and increased capital flows. The regression analysis examines how capital
volatility is affected by the interaction between de jure financial liberalization (an index of
liberalization) and de facto liberalization (the volume of capital flows). At average and high
volumes of capital, financial liberalization is found to increase capital volatility as expected.
At lower volumes of capital, financial liberalization reduces capital volatility, particularly for
foreign direct investment and other flows, indicating there may be a threshold level of capital
flows below which financial liberalization reduces volatility.
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1. Introduction 
 
Financial liberalization is often seen as a two-edged sword, providing much-needed 
capital inflows for domestic investment but also leaving countries vulnerable to the vagaries of 
the market and sudden capital outflows.  Recently, researchers have attempted to uncover the 
responses of economies to financial liberalization in terms of volatility.  Most of these studies 
have focused on the volatility of consumption and output (e.g., see Bekaert et al. 2006), with 
only a few focusing directly on the volatility of the capital flows themselves (e.g., see Alfaro et 
al.  2005, Broner and Rigobon 2004, Neumann et al. 2007).  This study takes a new approach to 
the volatility of capital inflows by examining the effects of financial liberalization and the 
concomitant capital flows that are expected to accompany liberalization.  To this end, we focus 
on the interaction between a de jure measure of financial liberalization (an index of 
liberalization) and a de facto measure (the volume of capital flows) and how this interaction 
might impact the volatility of capital flows.   
At average and high volumes of capital, financial liberalization is found to increase 
capital volatility as expected.  At lower volumes of capital, financial liberalization reduces 
capital volatility, particularly for foreign direct investment and other flows, indicating there may 




International financial integration is a complex process that can be defined and quantified 
by different measures, which can be categorized as de jure or de facto approaches.  Possible de 
jure measures of financial liberalization include indexes of the rules and laws governing 
international capital flows, such as the commonly used zero-one index formed from the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER).  The liberalization measure we use here is a de jure measure that 
attempts to capture the intensity of the rules governing capital flows.  By contrast, de facto 
measures of financial openness circumvent the quite limited range of values that de jure 
measures inherently take on as well as any subjectivity that may be present in their determination 
by focusing on the actual financial flows that occur across countries.  The volumes of capital 
inflows on which we focus here are posited to be larger with higher levels of financial openness 
and can be regarded as de facto measures of financial integration. 
We examine three distinct private capital inflow variables relative to GDP: FDI, portfolio 
investment flows that include both equity and debt investments, and other inflows that include 
bank loans and other short-term debt.  We use the following data from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS): FDI measured by DIE (direct investment in the economy, IFS 78bed), 
inward portfolio investment measured by PIL (portfolio investment liabilities, IFS 78bgd), and 
other inward flows measured by OIL (other investment liabilities, IFS 78bid).  To generate 
volatility measures of capital flows, we compute standard deviations of each capital flow relative 
to GDP over 5-year overlapping periods.
1  In the regression analysis, we account for the moving 
                                                 
1 We have also explored standardizing the standard deviation of flows relative to mean capital flows, 
essentially calculating a coefficient of variation.  This measure, however, is problematic because i.) it may 
not be well behaved when mean flows are small or negative (see Wei (2006) for a similar argument), and 
ii.) we include average capital flows as an explanatory variable in our estimated equation and thus do not 
want to include average flows as part of the derivation of the dependent variable.   2
average component introduced by the overlapping data and utilize heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors following the procedure in Bekaert et al. (2006). 
The countries chosen correspond to a set of developed economies for which Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2003) have computed a chronology of liberalization, leading to a financial 
liberalization variable that captures the intensity of liberalization.  This variable averages 
liberalization over three components: the capital account, the domestic financial system, and 
stock markets, with values ranging from 1 (no liberalization) to 3 (full liberalization).  The first 
and third components of the index correspond to international openness.  For example, the 
capital account component categorizes regulations on offshore borrowing, multiple exchange 
rates, and controls on capital outflows while the stock market component measures regulations 
on the acquisition of shares by foreigners along with restrictions on the repatriation of capital.  
The second component, on the domestic financial system, examines regulations on deposit and 
lending rates as well as foreign currency deposits and reserve requirements.  These three 
measures may be interrelated and are all expected to affect international capital; for example less 
regulation of the capital account and higher domestic interest rates may both attract international 
capital.  Thus, we utilize this broad index as the de jure measure of capital liberalization.  To 
match the annual capital flow data, we average Kaminsky and Schmukler’s monthly values over 
each year to get an annual value of the intensity of liberalization.
2 
We define the developed economies following the classification in Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (1999), using 1995 GNP per capita and the high income category as provided by the 
World Bank.  The countries in the sample include Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
3  Of the 
high-income countries for which the Kaminsky-Schmukler index is available, Denmark is 
dropped due to missing data prior to 1981 and Canada is dropped due to a lack of variation in the 
liberalization variable.  While the Kaminsky-Schmukler index is also available for a set of 
developing countries, we focus here on the developed economies partly due to data limitations 
on the developing countries and to highlight the interaction between liberalization and the 
volume of flows.
 4   Studying the patterns of capital flows for these economies can provide 
evidence of the behavior of different types of flows at the later stages of development. 
                                                 
2 See Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) for the chronology of financial liberalization that went into 
forming the liberalization index.  The index is available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/schmuklerpdfs/financial_liberalization_index.xls.  While other 
indexes exist, we focus here on the Kaminsky-Schmukler index because it measures the intensity of 
liberalization.  Miniane (2004) provides an alternative measure, based on the IMF’s AREAER, that 
measures the intensity of capital account restrictions.  However, the Miniane data cover 1983-2000 while 
our data cover 1977-2000.  For the period over which they overlap, the correlation between the two 
measures is approximately 0.75. 
3 Using a different classification, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) categorize Korea as a developing 
economy.  Our results are quite robust to the exclusion of Korea. 
4 The developed economies for which the liberalization variable is available show significant interactions 
between the volume of capital flows and the measure of liberalization.  Thus, we draw out the conclusions 
regarding this interaction in the current paper.  Conversely, the interaction term is not significant for the 
developing economies for which the liberalization variable is available.  See Neumann et al. (2007) for a 
comparative analysis of the impact of financial liberalization on the volatility of capital flows for a set of 
developed and developing countries.  While incorporating a broader range of explanatory variables, the 
results from that paper highlight the fact that the volume of flows appears to be a primary driver of the   3
We explore the relationship between the two measures to capture the response of capital 
volatility to both de jure and de facto liberalization.  Greater financial liberalization and larger 
capital inflows are expected to increase the volatility of these capital flows.  However, the 
relationship may be more complicated in that financial liberalization and capital inflows may not 
move step-for-step with one another.  A country may have limited access to foreign capital even 
if it is financially open.  Conversely, a country that is not deemed to be financially open to 
capital by de jure measures may, in fact, have large capital flows due to the circumvention of 
these capital controls.  Thus, we explore the interaction between the de jure and de facto 
measures. 
Regressions take the following general form: 
k k t i k k t i k k t i k k t i k k t i k k t i AVE LIB AVE LIB Stdev , , , , , , 3 , , 2 , , 1 , , ) ( + + + + + + + + + + = υ β β β α  
where Stdevi is our measure of volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of each capital flow 
relative to GDP estimated over k=5 year rolling windows.  LIBi is the financial liberalization 
variable from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), and is included as the average liberalization over 
each 5-year period.  AVEi is the average capital flow over each 5-year period.
5 
The inclusion of an interaction term between LIB and AVE into the regression equation 
permits us to examine whether the regression of Stdev on each of the measures of financial 
openness is a function of the other.  A statistically significant interaction term implies a different 
regression relationship between Stdev and LIB for each value of AVE.  Similarly, a different 
regression equation will exist for each value of LIB when Stdev is regressed on AVE.  This can be 
seen by restructuring the regression equation into either of two formulations (dropping time 
subscripts for convenience): 
ε β β β α + + + + = LIB AVE AVE Stdev ) ( ) ( 3 1 2       ( 1 )  
or 
ε β β β α + + + + = AVE LIB LIB Stdev ) ( ) ( 3 2 1        ( 2 )  
The response of Stdev to changes in the predictor (i.e., the ‘simple slope’) is now a 
function of the level of the other predictor.  We see that in (1) the marginal effect of LIB on Stdev 
depends on the values that AVE takes.  Likewise, the ‘simple slope’ of AVE in (2) is a function of 
the level of LIB.  The regression formulations in (1) and (2) each generate a series of regression 
equations of Stdev on one variable at specific values of the other variable.  Before creating their 
interaction, we center the variables LIB and AVE by subtracting the mean from each series, 
where the means are calculated over the full panel of countries and years.  Centering LIB and 
                                                                                                                                                             
volatility of flows for developing economies, with the interaction between financial liberalization and the 
volume of flows playing very little role.   
5 While other potential determinants of the volatility of capital flows exist, there is little agreement in the 
literature as to the relevant set of variables to include.  This is in contrast to the literature on the level of 
capital flows, where important determinants include institutional quality, levels of economic 
development, and default history (see for example Prasad et al. (2007) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)).  
Alfaro et al. (2005) and Broner and Rigobon (2004) have each looked at the effect of institutional quality 
on the volatility of capital flows.  Since we focus on volatility over five-year periods, we do not include 
institutional quality as these variables are typically slow to change.  In regressions not included here, we 
have examined a broader set of control variables (such as the variability in GDP growth rates and world 
interest rates) but find that the level of flows dominates these other factors in explaining the standard 
deviation of capital flows.   4
AVE in this manner facilitates interpretation of the estimated coefficients in the interaction 
analysis.  For example, the coefficient of LIB denotes the response of the volatility measure to 
changes in LIB when AVE is at its mean value (i.e., centered AVE=0).  Similar interpretation 
follows for the coefficient of AVE.
6 
We use a balanced pool of overlapping data from 1981-2000 to construct a 5 year rolling 
standard deviation series for each of the capital flow variables.
7  The use of overlapping 
observations, while allowing a larger sample from limited time series data, creates a problem for 
inference.  The observations are no longer independent due to the induced serial correlation 
between the observations.  The result is biased standard errors and possibly incorrect inferences.  
The moving average component that has been introduced into the residuals must be accounted 
for during the estimation process in order to correct for this bias.  We follow the procedure in 
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006, hereafter BHL), who develop a Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator to account for the serial correlation induced by overlapping 
observations within a cross-section time-series framework.  The GMM estimator of BHL (2006) 
builds on the Hansen-Hodrick (1980) and Newey-West (1987) correction procedures, and has the 
added benefit of accounting for country-specific heteroskedasticity and seemingly unrelated 
regression effects.   
BHL (2006) conduct two Monte Carlo experiments to explore finite sample properties of 
the behavior of the t-statistics on their liberalization variable.  Results from both experiments 
indicate that higher (absolute) critical values are required relative to the asymptotic normal 
distribution.  A cutoff of 3 is suggested for a 5% test.  We adopt this cutoff rule as a good 
standard for significance. 
Tables IA-C present the results of the interaction analysis between the financial openness 
measures for each of the financial flow variables.  We focus on the centered results but include 
the uncentered column (which maintains the original scale) for comparison.  As a check on 
robustness, a trend term and a 1997 dummy are also added to the model.  The trend is 
insignificant in all regressions, and may add to instability as it tends to be correlated with the 
liberalization variable.  We consider the 1997 dummy because capital flows may have fled the 
developing economies, seeking a safe haven in the developed economies and adding to volatility 
of flows in these countries.  The 1997 dummy is significant only for portfolio flows, perhaps 
indicating that these flows responded more strongly to the crisis.   
Across all three financial flow volatilities, the centered results show the interaction term 
is significant with a positive coefficient.  Since the variables are now centered at zero, this 
                                                 
6 The interaction term between LIB and AVE represents a multiplicative combination of these two 
predictors.  As such, it carries features of both predictors and is likely to be highly correlated with either 
or both, potentially introducing a problem of multicollinearity.  Neter et al. (1989) and Aiken and West 
(1991) argue that centering the variables can minimize the ‘non-essential’ multicollinearity introduced by 
including the interaction term, without affecting the ‘essential’ correlation that may already exist between 
LIB and AVE.  By contrast, Brambor et al. (2006) argue that centering does not provide any additional 
information and does not change the statistical properties of the estimation.  They note, however, that 
“problems associated with multicollinearity are often exaggerated in the context of multiplicative 
interaction models” (p. 70).  For our purposes, since the simple slope coefficients (i.e., the conditional 
coefficients) are invariant to such an additive transformation, centering the variables can help with 
interpretation without changing the results. 
7 Note that each year uses the previous five for the rolling data, e.g., the first year in the sample (1981) 
uses data over 1977-1981.   5
implies that developed countries with a high degree of financial liberalization and large capital 
flows are associated with higher capital flow volatility.  This is especially true for direct 
investment (DIE), where the interaction term is highly significant and robust to the inclusion of 
the trend or dummy term.  Other capital flows (OIL) show a significant interaction term, with 
borderline significance when the trend is included.  Notably, the magnitude of the coefficient 
stays the same across the specifications.  The portfolio flows (PIL) show a just-significant result 
without the trend or 1997 dummy.  The interaction term is no longer significant once the trend or 
dummy are included. 
Tables II and III present a further analysis of the interaction between LIB and AVE since 
the previous results show fairly consistently significant interaction terms.  For each financial 
flow variable, two separate analyses are presented based on equations (1) and (2).  Table II 
provides the simple slope regression with LIB as the predictor variable, where the slope 
coefficients are functions of the average flows of each variable (AVE).  In order to compute the 
response coefficient of LIB, unique values of AVE must be chosen.  Cohen and Cohen (1983) 
suggest using three values – the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and one standard 
deviation above the mean – to generate a set of three regression equations.
8  The standard errors 
can then be computed from the coefficient covariance matrix from the original regression results 
(Tables IA-C).  As before, significance testing for the simple slopes uses a t-value of 3 for the 5 
percent significance level as in BHL.  Similarly, Table III provides the simple slope with AVE as 
the predictor variable, for three values of LIB. 
The  LIB analysis in Table II indicates that, at average and high levels of direct 
investment, there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the financial openness 
variable LIB and the volatility of capital flows.  For low levels of direct investment volume, 
however, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between LIB and volatility.   
Thus, it appears that foreign direct investment flows increase in volatility from liberalization 
when there are already high volumes of investment but decrease in volatility due to liberalization 
at low levels of capital flows.  The coefficient signs are similar for portfolio flows (PIL) and 
would be significant at standard significance levels.  Using the significance levels indicated by 
BHL (2006), however, the response by portfolio flows is insignificant, thus indicating that 
liberalization may have little relationship to the volatility of these flows.  Other capital flows 
(OIL) show an insignificant response to liberalization when capital flows are large but face 
significant reductions in volatility due to liberalization at average and lower levels of capital 
flows. 
Overall, the results in Table II provide evidence of increases in volatility from financial 
liberalization only when capital inflows are high.  Liberalization may actually reduce volatility 
when capital inflows are lower, perhaps indicating some threshold below which financial 
liberalization reduces volatility. 
For the alternative specification, Table III generally shows that increases in capital flows 
are positively related to the volatility of these flows for any level of liberalization.  This is 
particularly true for other flows, where any level of liberalization provides evidence of increased 
volatility from increased capital inflows.  Likewise, volatility increases with greater flows of 
direct investment and portfolio capital, at average and higher levels of liberalization.  At low 
                                                 
8 An alternative procedure could be implemented using a different additive transformation of the 
predictors (as in Braumoeller, 2004).  Using the deciles of each centered predictor as the additive factor, 
the results obtained (available from the authors) are markedly similar qualitatively to those found in 
Tables II and III.   6
levels of liberalization, however, the increase in capital flows for direct investment and portfolio 




We take a new approach to the study of volatility as a result of international capital flows.  
Focusing on 13 developed economies, we investigate whether the interaction between a de jure 
measure of capital liberalization and a de facto measure based on the volume of capital flows 
influences the volatility of those capital flows.  The paper examines foreign direct investment, 
portfolio capital, and other debt flows.  Finding a significant interaction term between 
liberalization and the volume of flows, we estimate the effect of each predictor at three different 
levels of the other predictor, i.e., the mean and plus/minus one standard deviation.  We find that 
the volume of capital flows generally corresponds to an increase in the volatility of flows 
regardless of the level of liberalization.  More interesting results are found for the liberalization 
variable.  At average and high levels of capital flows, financial liberalization is associated with 
increases in capital volatility.  At low levels of capital flows, however, financial liberalization is 
associated with declines in volatility, pointing to a threshold effect.  Thus the de jure measure of 
financial openness implies that volatility for all three capital flows will decline with a lessening 
of capital controls if the flow volume at the time of increasing financial openness is relatively 
low.  As a consequence, in the earlier stages of development, countries may be able to take 
advantage of increased capital flows from financial liberalization without incurring the costs 
associated with increased volatility of capital flows.  As countries develop, further financial 
liberalization may lead to increased capital volatility.  This increased volatility may not 
necessarily be detrimental as countries may then be able to weather sufficiently the increased 
volatility.    7
TABLE IA Dependent variable: SDIE (Stdev of direct investment) 












































   0.1199 
(1.9546) 
 
TABLE IB Dependent variable: SPIL (Stdev of portfolio investment) 












































   -0.8377 
(-3.0769) 
 
TABLE IC Dependent variable: SOIL (Stdev of other investment liabilities) 














































   0.1409 
(0.6422) 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses.  LIB and AVE have been centered (mean subtraction) in the 
‘Centered’ columns.  The interaction term LIB*AVE in these columns is the product of the LIB and AVE 
variables after each has been centered.  Tables II and III also use these centered variables. 
SDIE, SPIL, SOIL are the 5-year rolling standard deviations of each capital flow (DIE, PIL, OIL) relative 
to GDP.  Countries include Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.  Number of observations: 260.  8
TABLE II: LIB Analysis 
 
LIB AVEDIE AVEDIE SDIE ) 4508 . 0 2889 . 0 ( ) 5494 . 0 5424 . 0 ( + + + =  
 
AVEDIE  Simple Slope of LIB  Standard Error   T-statistic 
1 Std. Dev. Below Mean  -0.369  0.079  -4.67 
Mean 0.289  0.086  3.36 
1 Std. Dev. Above Mean  0.947  0.220  4.30 
 
 
LIB AVEPIL AVEPIL SPIL ) 3502 . 0 4766 . 0 ( ) 5859 . 0 4588 . 1 ( + + + =  
 
AVEPIL  Simple Slope of LIB  Standard Error  T-statistic 
1 Std. Dev. Below Mean  -0.731  0.252  -2.90 
Mean 0.477  0.222  2.15 
1 Std. Dev. Above Mean  1.685  0.603  2.79 
 
 
LIB AVEOIL AVEOIL SOIL ) 2512 . 0 4367 . 0 ( ) 3320 . 0 9552 . 1 ( + − + + =  
 
AVEOIL  Simple Slope of LIB  Standard Error  T-statistic 
1 Std. Dev. Below Mean  -1.677  0.226  -7.42 
Mean -0.437  0.134  -3.25 
1 Std. Dev. Above Mean  0.803  0.327  2.46 
 
See notes for Table I   9
TABLE III: AVE Analysis 
 




Simple Slope of 
AVEDIE 
Standard Error  T-statistic 
1 Std. Dev. Below Mean  0.260  0.108  2.41 
Mean 0.549  0.049  11.27 
1 Std. Dev. Above Mean  0.838  0.029  28.90 
 
 




Simple Slope of 
AVEPIL 
Standard Error  T-statistic 
1 Std. Dev. Below Mean  0.362  0.125  2.90 
Mean 0.586  0.068  8.62 
1 Std. Dev. Above Mean  0.810  0.070  11.57 
 
 




Simple Slope of 
AVEOIL 
Standard Error  T-statistic 
1 Std. Dev. Below Mean  0.171  0.053  3.23 
Mean 0.332  0.031  10.66 
1 Std. Dev. Above Mean  0.493  0.035  14.09 
 
See notes for Table I   10
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